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Abstract 
The literature on party system nationalization has yet to provide a better understanding of the 
impact of short-term factors upon the nationalization of politics. This paper contributes to fill 
this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system 
nationalization. Our argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalization 
E\DPSOLI\LQJWHUULWRULDOYDULDWLRQLQSUHIHUHQFHVIRUUHGLVWULEXWLRQOLPLWLQJSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶
capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new 
political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960-2011 period confirm this hypothesis and 
show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated to a 
decrease in levels of party system nationalization in the next election. The result is robust to 
variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of 
nationalization. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic 
conditions on the nationalization of politics, whereas we do not find any moderating effect of 
electoral system proportionality on the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last thirty years, the comparative literature on party systems has travelled a long way in 
exploring the main components of party competition dynamics. While most of the early 
studies on party systems focused on the number of parties (Sartori, 1976, Lijphart and Aitkin, 
1994, Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), the degree of polarization (Knutsen, 1998, Sani and 
Sartori, 1983) or the figure level of institutionalization (Harmel and Svåsand, 1993, 
Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) recent advancements in the area have given attention to the 
nationalization of electoral politics, meaning the extent to which parties receive similar levels 
of electoral support throughout the country1. The growing literature on party system 
nationalization has brought significant theoretical and empirical insights into the role of 
historical processes and institutions in explaining in the origins of party systems and cross-
country variation in the levels of nationalization (Caramani, 2004, Morgenstern et al., 2009, 
Harbers, 2010, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2011, Rodden and Wibbels, 2011, Chhibber and 
Kollman, 2004, Golosov, 2014). Yet, some issues still call for further attention, particularly 
the role of short-term factors in explaining changes in levels of nationalization.  
In this paper we purport to advance studies in the area by exploring the impact of economic 
conditions upon upon static/distributional nationalization, i.e. the degree of heterogeneity of 
party support across electoral districts. By focusing on the role of economic crises, our paper 
aims to provide a better understanding of the degree of resilience of the nationalization of 
politics against short-term economic shocks. A large number of studies have shown that 
economic outcomes, measured both objectively and subjectively, are crucial to understand 
the electoral fate of incumbent parties (Lewis-Beck, 1990, Duch and Stevenson, 2008, 
Nadeau et al., 2002, Powell and Whitten, 1993, Nannestad and Paldam, 1994), and the 
financial economic crisis that broke out in 2008 has spawned various studies on its effects on 
political competition and party system dynamics (Kriesi, 2014, Bellucci et al., 2012, Lewis-
Beck and Nadeau, 2012). However, this paper represents a first attempt to explore its 
implications upon the nationalization of politics. 
                                                          
1
 By nationalization we refer to the degree to which party support is homogeneous across electoral districts 
(defined as static nationalization, see Morgernsten 2009), so high levels of nationalization mean that electoral 
competition is similar across the cRXQWU\¶VVXE-national units, whereas in a context of low nationalization the 
SDWWHUQRIHOHFWRUDOFRPSHWLWLRQYDULHVDFURVVVXEQDWLRQDOXQLWVSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOVXSSRUWFRQFHQWUDWHVLQVRPH
sub-national units but is weak elsewhere. A dynamic definition of nationalization focuses on the degree of 
uniformity in electoral swings across districts. SHH6FKDWWVFKQHLGHU¶VDSSURDFKGHYHORSHGLQRWKHUSDSHUV
such as Clagget et al. (1984), Kawato (1987), Aleman and Kellam (2008), or Morgenstern et al. (2009). 
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Our argument is that economic crises reduce the nationalization of the party system. We 
argue this happens through different mechanisms. First, the asymmetric impact of economic 
shocks amplifies territorial variation in preferences for redistribution. As a result, political 
parties lose capacity to aggregate heterogeneous preferences and to reconcile divergent social 
interests, which makes less likely for them to maintain similar patterns of support across the 
territory. Second, recessions may result in lower levels of nationalization through the 
emergence of new political forces, which we expect to have more heterogeneous electoral 
support across districts. Finally, we also argue that certain institutional contexts can amplify 
or mediate this effect. In particular, we explore the effect of federal institutions and electoral 
systems in moderating the relationship between economic growth and party system 
nationalization.  
Using data for 52 countries for the 1960 - 2011 period, our findings indicate that economic 
downturns in the three to four years prior to the election are associated to a decrease in levels 
of party system nationalization of around half a standard deviation. In addition, we find a 
significant effect of federal institutions in moderating the negative impact of economic crises 
on nationalization and no significant interactive effect of electoral rules. 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section provides an overview of the literature and 
section 3 develops the main argument of the paper. Section 4 presents the data, section 5 
discusses the results, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Party System Nationalization and Economic crises 
Long-term causes driving the nationalization of politics have been mostly explored in relation 
to the formation and consolidation of party systems. One of the most influential works in the 
area is Caramani (2004), who showed that structural trends associated to nation-building 
processes as well as to industrialization made political competition more nationalized. Since 
WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI&DUDPDQL¶VLQIOXHQWLDOstudy, follow-up works on the role of structural 
factors in nationalization have focused on institutional variables such as electoral rules, the 
type of executive-legislative relations (presidential vs. parliamentary) or decentralization 
(Chhibber and Kollman, 2004, Hicken and Stoll, 2011, Morgenstern et al., 2009, Hicken, 
2009, Leiras, 2006, Simón, 2013) as well as on other conditions such as economic and ethnic 
divisions (Selway, 2011, de Miguel Moyer, 2012, Cox and Knoll, 2003). 
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The study of electoral systems has probably provided the most significant theoretical and 
empirical insights in explaining heterogeneity in the distribution of party votes across districts 
(Jones and Mainwaring, 2003, Cox and Knoll, 2003, Cox, 1999, Brancati, 2008, Harbers, 
2010, Golosov, 2014, Carey and Shugart, 1995). For instance, Morgenstern et al. (2009) 
show that the degree of party system nationalization is lower in plurality systems than in 
proportional ones. In plurality systems there are districts that parties will lose or win anyway, 
so parties have incentives to target competition in swing constituencies, which may 
contribute to increase heterogeneity in the distribution of support across districts. Conversely, 
in PR systems all votes count the same, so parties have incentives to win votes everywhere 
and therefore develop competition strategies in all districts (Morgenstern et al. 2009: 1327).  
Another important area in the study of the causes of nationalization comes from the analysis 
of decentralization in explaining cross-country and over time variation in party system 
nationalization. The path-breaking study in this area is the work of Chhibber and Kollman 
(2004) ZKRDUJXHWKDWHOLWHV¶LQFHQWLYHVWRFRRUGLQDWHnationally will depend on how much at 
stake there is at the national level, so periods of centralization will be followed by higher 
levels of party aggregation, while periods of decentralization will bring lower levels of party 
nationalization. However, there is a potential reverse causation in the argument (Brancati, 
2006, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2011, Lublin, 2012). Decentralization reforms may 
decrease nationalization by increasing the number of competing parties. Yet the nature of 
party competition that results from a more fragmented party system may in turn contribute to 
reinforce decentralization reforms, as some empirical cases in the literature suggest (Alonso, 
2012)2.  
Certainly, one of the difficulties in theorizing about party system nationalization is to set neat 
causal relations between nationalization and its potential explanatory variables. 
Nationalization can have consequences for, but also reflect, different aspects of political 
competition, and this may turn some causal explanations into circular arguments. For 
instance, low nationalization can be associated to voters responding more to local issues 
                                                          
2
 The argument overlooks the capacity of parties to adapt their electoral strategies and organization to a new 
distribution of powers between the national and regional arenas, which in turn may prevent party system 
fragmentation (Hopkin and van Houten, 2009: 131±132). Although Chibber and Kollman focus on the impact of 
GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLQWKHQXPEHURISDUWLHVSUHGLFWLQJD³GLVDJJUHJDWLQJ´HIIHFWRIGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQUHIRUPVWKLV
impact may be neutralized if parties adapt their organization, message and strategies so as to maintain their 
electoral position (Hopkin, 2009b: 182). 
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(Schattschneider, 1960); to legislators having career concerns oriented towards the regional 
political agenda and institutions (Samuels, 1999) or to parties being more likely to orient their 
electoral messages toward specific -ethnic or national- groups (Stepan, 2001). However, it is 
difficult to define the specific causal pathway between these variables and the degree of party 
system nationalization, as causality could operate in both directions.3 In sum, any attempt to 
disentangle the specific causal relation between different aspects of political competition and 
nationalization may render the argument circular4. 
In summary, what a review of the literature suggests is that nationalization is associated to 
specific patterns of electoral competition that have important implications for different 
aspects of politics5. This competition setting into which nationalization LV³HPEHGGHG´DFWVDV
a self-reinforcing mechanism of the particular level of nationalization: under a strongly 
(weakly) nationalized party system voters, legislators and parties will be more oriented 
WRZDUGVWKH³QDWLRQDO´ (subnational) level, which may help to sustain high (low) levels of 
nationalization. If nationalization is associated to a more or less ³QDWLRQDO-IULHQGO\´FRQWH[WRI
political competition, then few changes in levels of nationalization might be expected. This 
speaks to the issue of nationalization dynamics and its driving forces, a topic that lags 
theoretically and empirically behind in the burgeoning literature on party system 
nationalization. As previous works have mostly focused on the impact of long-term factors in 
the formation and consolidation of party systems, the literature gap is most noticeable in the 
analysis of short-term factors in accounting for the dynamics of nationalization.  
In this paper we purport to fill this theoretical and empirical gap by exploring the effect of 
economic crises in the nationalization of electoral competition.  
 
3. The Argument 
                                                          
3
  )RULQVWDQFHVXEQDWLRQDOLVVXHVDUHOLNHO\WREHPRUHLPSRUWDQWLQQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWRUV¶FDUHHUVZKHQ
QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQLVORZ%XWOHJLVODWRU¶VFDUHHUFRQFHUQVDWWKHVXEQDWLRQDOOHvel may increase the degree of 
dissimilarity in the distribution of support across constituencies (arguably through heterogeneity in electoral 
appeals through districts). 
4
 If we broaden the meaning of nationalization beyond a narrow operationalization (ie: they party system 
nationalization score) and consider than nationalization means that voters or legislators are national-oriented, 
then any attempt to establish a causal relationship turns into a tautology. 
5
 Variation in the degree to which parties and party systems are nationalized may have important implications 
over various critical aspects of politics such as the representation of social groups, the balance of power between 
legislature and executives or government spending (Crisp et al., 2013, Calvo and Leiras, 2012, Castañeda-
Angarita, 2013, Jurado, 2014, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2011, Hicken et al., 2010, Simmons et al., 2011).  
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In this paper we spouse the argument that economic crises reduce the nationalization of the 
party system through two mechanisms. For one, recessions may amplify territorial variation 
in preferences for redistribution by making more difficult for political parties to aggregate 
territorial preferences. For two, economic crises increase the likelihood that new small and 
territorially based political parties enter the electoral arena. 
The first mechanism (economic downturns amplify territorial variation in preferences for 
redistribution) is grounded on two assumptions. First, cRXQWULHV¶HFRQRPLHVGHYHORSZLWK
certain territorial specialization that correlates with variation in the demand for redistribution 
and taxes (Beramendi, 2012), so individuals in relatively well-off regions will be less likely 
to support redistribution than those living in poorer territories (for experimental evidence on 
this assumption see (Fernández-Albertos et al., 2013). The second assumption is that the 
impact of recession on regional economic activity is asymmetric and it results in a deepening 
of the inter-regional economic gap. Regional economic disparities increase if:  i) rich regions 
benefit from recession or remain unaffected, whereas poor regions are adversely hit or ii) 
poorer regions decrease more than richer6. This assumption can be supported empirically. If 
we regress economic growth on regional variation of per capita GDP in 17 OECD countries 
for the 1990-2013 period, we find that there is a negative and significant association between 
the two variables (see table A.1 in the appendix). So when the economy experiences a 
downturn, regional disparities tend to increase substantially. We argue that this asymmetric 
impact of recession upon regional economic activity increases variation in redistributive 
preferences and, in turn, makes the redistributive conflict more intense.   
A more heterogeneous territorial demand for redistribution hampers the capacity of political 
parties to fulfill their essential function, namely the aggregation of different preferences. The 
modern conceptualization of representative democracy envisions elections as a peacefully 
competition between conflicting interests and values (Schumpeter, 1942, Przeworski, 2003), 
and political parties play an essential role in aggregating divergent interests when competing 
                                                          
6
 Recession may also have detrimental effects across the board, making wealthier regions, in addition to poorer 
ones, poorer. This would lead to an increase in support for redistribution across territories and, in turn, to more 
homogeneous preferences for redistribution. However, according to the OECD data (OECD 2016), recession is 
more clearly associated to an increase in regional disparity than to a decrease of the inter-regional economic 
gap. Among the 22 OECD countries in which some regions experienced a decrease in GDP per capita during the 
2008-2013 period, in 13 of them the evolution of the economy resulted in an increase in regional disparities (in 
8 countries poorer regions decreased more than the richer and in 5 countries the poorer decreased and richer 
increased); whereas in 9 of them it resulted in convergence (in 6 of them poorer decreased less than the richer 
and in 3 of them poorer increased and richer decreased). 
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for power. But the more heterogeneous these preferences are, the more difficult it is for 
parties to aggregate them into a single electoral platform. With an increasing inter-regional 
gap around redistribution, parties are forced to face more policy trade-offs and the 
prioritization of some policies may turn their electoral platforms into less encompassing 
political movements, also in its territorial dimension. Economic downturns thus make it 
harder for political parties to reconcile divergent economic preferences and, in turn, to 
maintain similar patterns of support across the territory by mobilizing distinct issues in 
different constituencies. As a result, we expect a decline in levels of party system 
nationalization. 
In the second mechanism we claim that recession reduces party system nationalization by (i) 
decreasing support for incumbents, and (ii) facilitating the emergence of new parties, as 
voters shift their support from incumbents to alternative forces (and not just opposition 
forces) which are more likely to have territorialised bases of support.  
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHHFRQRPLFYRWLQJOLWHUDWXUHWKHHFRQRP\PDWWHUVWRWKHLQFXPEHQWV¶
electoral fate (Duch and Stevenson, 2008, Lewis-Beck, 1990)7, particularly when the 
economy is performing poorly and the range of issues to which LQGLYLGXDOV¶YRWHUHVSRQG
narrow down to the economy (Bellucci et al., 2012, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012, Nadeau 
et al., 2002). Following this literature, we expect incumbent parties to be punished for the 
negative economic consequences of economic downturns. Although the links between size of 
the electoral support and party system nationalization have been barely explored, there is 
some evidence showing that party decline (growth) is accompanied by lower (higher) 
territorial fragmentation of SDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOVXSSRUW (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). So we 
H[SHFWWKHLQFXPEHQW¶VHOHFWRUDOGHFOLQHWRUHGXFHSDUW\system nationalization8. In addition,  
the  impact of economic recession may go well beyond the ousting of power of incumbent 
parties and challenge the whole party system if disaffected voters do not (only) turn to 
opposition parties but to new political forces9. Actually, as recent economic literature on the 
ILQDQFLDOFULVLVVKRZVYRWHUV¶UHVHQWPHQWWRPDLQVWUHDPSDUWLHVDQGWRHVWDEOLVKHG
                                                          
7
 See Anderson (2007) and Healy and Malhotra (2013) for a review of this literature. 
8
 The net effect of recessions upon party system nationalization will depend on ZKHWKHULQFXPEHQWSDUWLHV¶
electoral decline and its impact upon nationalization cancels out with higher electoral growth (and 
nationalization) of the opposition parties. 
9
 Otherwise, if no new parties are formed, the net effect of recessions upon party system nationalization will 
GHSHQGRQZKHWKHULQFXPEHQWSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOGHFOLQHDQGLWVHIIHFWXSRQQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQFDQFHOVRXWZLWK
higher electoral growth (and nationalization) of vote to opposition parties. 
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³SROLWLFDOHOLWHV´ did nurture the support for new political forces (Kriesi 2014). As less 
consolidated or mature political forces tend to have more heterogeneous electoral support 
across districts (Caramani 2004), their expected electoral success under economic recession 
will result in lower levels of nationalization. 
Thus, our main argument is that bad economic outcomes will reduce party system 
nationalization. A further question is whether institutions moderate the relationship between 
both variables.  We explore the moderating effect of two institutions: electoral rules and 
federalism. First, it has been well established in the literature that electoral rules have a 
significant impact in accounting for variation in levels of nationalization, showing that single-
member district plurality systems exhibit lower levels of nationalization relative to 
proportional ones (Caramani, 2004, Ishiyama and Kennedy, 2001, Bochsler, 2010b, 
Morgenstern et al., 2009). However, the theorization of how electoral rules may moderate the 
impact of recessions upon nationalization does not yield conclusive predictions. On the one 
hand, as stated above, recessions may make it more difficult for parties to attract different 
types of voters in distinct constituencies through heterogeneous electoral platforms, and these 
coordination problems may become more acute under SMD due to the higher number of 
electoral districts. On the other hand, in proportional systems electoral rules may facilitate the 
emergence of new political forces, which may also contribute to decrease levels of 
nationalization. In summary, both SMD and proportional systems have characteristics that 
may intensify the negative impact of recessions upon nationalization so there is no way in 
which we can hypothesize whether some electoral rules may have a bigger moderating effect 
than others.  
Second, as for the role of federal institutions, the literature has not provided yet conclusive 
empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralized forms of governance (political 
or fiscal) and levels of party system nationalization (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2011; 
Morgenstern et al. 2009). Yet unlike electoral rules, predictions regarding the moderating role 
of federalism in the relationship between economic recessions and party system 
nationalization are more straightforward. The different mechanisms through which we have 
hypothesized a negative impact of recessions upon levels of nationalization are more likely to 
develop under decentralized political structures than under centralized ones. First, the 
organizational bonds between national and local party leaders are looser under decentralized 
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settings (Thorlakson, 2009) so the aggregation of divergent preferences (which becomes 
more difficult as a result of the economic recession) is a more daunting task under 
decentralized party structures. Second, decentralization gives way to a regionalized frame of 
party competition in which policy solutions vary according to specific regional conditions 
(Detterbeck and Jeffery, 2009). Differentiated policy programmes allow party leaders to 
better adopt their electoral pledges to the heterogeneous demands of regional constituencies 
and interest groups (Alonso and Gómez, 2010, Swenden and Maddens, 2009). If as a 
consequence of the economic crisis, preferences across districts become more divergent, the 
existence of regional political parties may allow for a more intense expression of these 
differences across the territory, and in turn, contribute to widen the distinctiveness of 
electoral appeals and preferences across districts.   
4. Data, Variables, and Method 
We test the previous argument with a panel data of 52 countries. As we want to account for 
the effect of economic conditions on the electoral results, our unit of observation is the 
electoral results after an election cycle. Table A.2 shows all the elections and countries 
contained in the sample. As it can be seen, time coverage ranges from 1960 to 2011 and it is 
very unbalanced across countries.  
Our dependent variable is the Party System Nationalization Score (PSNS) created by 
Bochsler (2010a). This measure is a transformation of the Gini coefficient on inequalities in 
distribution of partiHV¶YRWHVKDUHVDFURVVHOHFtoral districts. We use the standardized and 
weighted version of this index, whose advantage is that it accounts for the size and the 
varying number of electoral districts within a country. As a robustness variable, we use 
.DVX\DDQG0RHQLXV¶(2008) Inflation and Dispersion Score. This index measures the extent 
to which party competition in each district is different from party competition at the national 
aggregate level and the variation across districts of the extent of each districts' contribution to 
national-level party system inflation. It has the opposite direction to the PSNS. Higher values 
of the score indicate lower levels of nationalization. Both variables are taken from Kollman et 
al.¶V (2014) database and draw upon legislative elections. 
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To measure the effect of economic conditions, we use the economic growth rates published 
by the World Bank Development Indicators (2015). We use several economic growth 
variables, accounting for different spans of economic conditions. Election year growth is the 
GDP growth rate on the election year (when the election takes place in the first six months of 
a year, we take the economic growth of the previous year) 10. Growth 2 years is the sum of 
growth rates on the election year and the previous year. Growth 3 years aggregates the 
growth on the election year and the two previous years. Finally, Growth 4 years is the sum of 
growth rates of the three prior years to the election and on the election year. As a robustness 
check we create four similar variables using changes in unemployment rates. We use the 
unemployment rates based on national statistics that are published in the World Bank 
Development Indicators (2015).  
To have a more nuanced measurement of the impact of the economy upon the dependent 
variable, we divide these variables into quintiles. The first quintile represents the 20% of 
observations with lowest levels of economic growth of the whole sample11, while the fifth 
quintile represents the 20% of observations with highest levels of economic growth. We 
operationalize economic crises as the observations in the lowest quintile of economic growth. 
We do this for each of the different economic growth variables to capture non-linear effects 
and whether the impact of economic growth upon levels of nationalization is different 
between economic recessions and economic upturns. As an illustration, the mean value of 
lowest quintile of the Growth 2 years variable is a total growth of -0.9% of the GDP over the 
two years before the election, while the mean value of highest quintile is a growth of 16.94%. 
For the Growth 3 years variable, the mean of lowest quintile is a growth of -0.06% over the 
three prior years to the elections, while for the highest quintile is 24.16%. In all models, we 
use the third quintile as reference category12. 
Our analyses include several control variables. First, we include FRXQWULHV¶population, 
measured in its natural logarithm. Larger countries would tend to have lower levels of 
nationalization as larger populations host more diversity of interests that can become relevant 
                                                          
10
 We have also operationalized this variable as growth on the whole election year when the election takes place 
in the first months, and the results do not change. 
11
 Most of the countries have at least one observation in the lowest quintile group, so we are reassured that any 
specific country does not drive the results. We have also jack-knifed the models and the results hold (results not 
shown). 
12
 Results are robust to cutting the economic growth variable in either less (such as quartiles) or more groups. 
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in an electoral contest. We also control for GDP levels. It is expected that economic 
development leads to higher levels of nationalization (Caramani 2004). We include the 
variable in its lagged electoral term value (GDP level in the previous election) not to have 
cofounding effects with our economic growth variable. Empirical models also control for 
electoral system proportionality. Morgenstern et al. (2009) find that single-member-district 
countries have lower levels of electoral nationalization, so we introduce as a control the 
average district magnitude, measured in its natural logarithm. Finally, we control for trade 
exposure, measured as the sum of exports and imports over the GDP. The rationale is that 
trade, as economic models acknowledge, tends to have asymmetric effects across the country, 
being some regions more affected by it than others. The asymmetric impact of trade may 
result in more heterogeneous interests and, in turn, of voting behavior across districts. We 
expect more party system regionalization the higher the exposure to trade. All control 
variables are taken from the World Development Indicators (2015) or Bormann and Golder 
(2013). Additional control variables that display time-invariant trends are included in the 
robustness checks. 
Finally, as we are interested in the change in party system nationalization over the electoral 
term, we employ fixed-effects models. We include a first-order autoregressive term to 
account for serial correlation13. As a robustness check, and to avoid any concerns on non-
stationarity, we run error correction models, where a lagged dependent variable is included, 
the dependent variable is explicitly modeled as first-difference, and all independent variables 
are included both in their first difference and lagged values (accounting for the short-term 
effects, and long-term effects of the variables).  
5. Results 
Table 1 runs the main econometric model of the paper, testing the effect of economic growth 
on the PSNS score splitting the economic growth variables into quintiles14. Two results are 
                                                          
13
 Results are robust to the non-inclusion of the autoregressive term. 
14
 The control variables deserve also some comment, in particular because their effects hold consistent 
throughout all the econometric models that are shown below. First, we find an effect of the electoral system on 
party system nationalization. Elections that take place under more proportional systems, with larger district 
magnitudes, result in more regionalized party systems. This result goes against Morgenstern et al. (2009) who 
provide evidence of less nationalized electorates in single-member district systems. Second, we do find a strong 
effect of the population level on the variation in party system nationalization. Larger countries tend to increase 
their levels of electoral regionalization. This supports the argument that bigger political communities are more 
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worth noting. First, models 1.1 through 1.4 show that there is a strong and significant positive 
impact of economic growth on levels of party system nationalization. However, and more 
specifically, the effect of GDP growth upon levels of nationalization only operates through 
the lowest quintile. Put it differently, results in Table 1 suggest that the impact of the 
economy upon PSNS is not a linear one: it only operates for economic downturns. Compared 
to medium levels of growth, low economic growth has a significant impact in reducing 
nationalization. However, when the economy goes well, there does not seem to be any 
significant impact on the nationalization of politics.  
Second, it must be noted that the impact of the economy on the nationalization of politics 
becomes again more intense when we measure growth over a long period of time before the 
election. The coefficient is not significant for the election year (model 1.1), or two years prior 
to the election (model 1.2). An economic downturn is only significant in models 1.3 and 1.4. 
This finding is consistent with the type of mechanisms we developed in the theoretical 
section to account for the relationship between economic recessions and party system 
nationalization. Economic crises moderate the level of nationalization of politics through 
mechanisms (i.e. changes in preferences for redistribution across territories or the emergence 
of new political parties, etc) that are more likely to unfold in a gradual way throughout the 
electoral term. This means that low economic growth just before the election might be not 
enough to change significantly the nationalization of the party system. A more extensive 
FULVLVPLJKWEHQHHGHGWRFKDQJHHOLWHV¶VWUDWHJLHVDQGYRWHUV¶SDWWHUQVDFURVVWKHWHUULWRU\. In 
terms of the magnitude of the effect, an economic crisis has an average impact on the 
variation in nationalization of half a standard deviation, which is a sizable impact15. 
In the next tables we conduct robustness checks for the dependent variable (table 2), the main 
independent variable (table 3), additional control variables (table 4) and the statistical method 
(table 5). The first robustness check consists in testing the effect of economic crises using a 
different dependent variable. In table 4 the dependent variable is Moenius and Kasu\D¶V
(2008) Inflation and Dispersion Score. Note that for this variable higher values mean lower 
levels of nationalization (so the expected sign of the coefficients change). As models 2.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
likely to be more heterogeneous and, therefore, to exhibit lower nationalization scores. Third, the degree to 
which countries are exposed to trade is negatively associated to party system nationalization, indicating that the 
impact of the state of the economy in the party system is stronger in more open economies.  
15
 The dependent variable ±variation in PSNS- has a mean value of -0.0018 and a standard deviation of 0.056. 
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through 2.4 show, we obtain similar results as with the PSNS16. For the lowest quintile of 
economic growth we find a positive and significant impact on the inflation index, which 
implies a reduction in the level of nationalization. This effect is displayed again only when 
we account for larger time spans of low growth than the election year17. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In the second check, we measure the state of the economy with a variable that captures 
changes in the unemployment rate. As our hypothesis is about recession, we now predict a 
negative impact of economics crises upon levels of nationalization when positive changes in 
the annual rates take place (that is, when levels of unemployment increase). We divide the 
unemployment rate again into quintiles, so each quintile captures 20% of observations of the 
distribution of the unemployment rate. Models 3.1 through 3.4 show, despite the low number 
of observations, that unemployment is associated to lower nationalization scores, but only for 
the highest positive changes in the rate of unemployment. In model 3.3 the fourth and fifth 
quintiles of unemployment growth are significant, while in model 3.4 the fourth quintile is 
significant and the fifth close to significant. Yet data do not support a reverse effect: a 
decrease in the unemployment rate does not result in an increase in higher levels of 
nationalization of politics. This finding supports our theoretical argument that it is economic 
crises more generally (and not just growth) what affects levels of PSNS.   
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In the third robustness check, we include further control variables to avoid any omitted 
variable bias. In particular, we include the level of ethnic fractionalization18, the level of 
democracy ±measured with the Polity index-, and the age of democracy- measured as the 
number of years that the country has continuously had a score of 8 or more in the Polity 
index. The rationale is that ethnic diverse countries are expected to have lower levels of party 
system nationalization (Lublin, 2015) and that nationalized party systems flourish in 
consolidated and high-quality democracies (Golosov, 2014). However, the ethnic 
fractionalization and democracy variables display sluggish or time-invariant trends and 
therefore have not been included in the previous fixed-effects models. Table 4 replicates the 
                                                          
16
 Correlation between both nationalization scores is -0.619 in the elections contained in the sample. 
17
 As for the models with PSNS as dependent variable, the economic growth in the five years prior to the 
election has no significant effect on inflation. 
18
 This variable is taken from Selway (2011) and it is a time invariant measure. 
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previous models with the Growth 3 years (quintiles) and Growth 4 years (quintiles) variables, 
including these three additional controls without fixed-effects. We regress the models on the 
PSNS score, and the inflation score. The results are remarkably robust. The ethnic 
fractionalization measure is significant, but the effect of the low growth variables remains 
significant as well at a slightly smaller magnitude. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we test that the results are not dependent on fixed-effects time-series-cross-sectional 
model by using an error correction model. In these models, the dependent variable is 
explicitly modeled as first-difference, and all independent variables are included both in their 
first difference and lagged values: the former accounting for the short-term effects, and the 
latter for the long-term effects of the variables. This way, the growth variable will account for 
the short-term effects of the economy on party system nationalization, while the lagged GDP 
values will account for the long-term effects. This allows calculating the extent to which 
periods of economic growth have effects beyond the next election. 
The results are shown in Table 519. We run the analyses using both the PSNS and the Inflation 
Score as dependent variables. To make tables more readable we create a dummy variable 
called economic crisis, which takes value 1 when the economic growth variable is in the 
lowest quintile and 0 otherwise.  
Results show that the impact of economic growth is robust to different estimations of the 
econometric model. All models exhibit a significant effect of economic growth in the 
predicted direction (a negative effect on PSNS and a positive effect on the inflation score). In 
addition, the models show that the effect of the economy is just a short-term effect. The 
insignificant coefficients of the GDP per capita variables confirm that economic growth just 
has an impact on the nationalization of the follow-up election. The effects do not display 
longer over time and it is restricted to the electoral contest following the economic downturn.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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 To prove the empirical robustness of the argument of this paper, we have also run alternative estimations (not 
shown here) with a LDV and no fixed effects, such as random-effects models, and Arellano-Bond models and 
the results are confirmed as well. 
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We have shown so far that economic crises reduce levels of party system nationalization. We 
now move on to explore whether institutions, namely the electoral system, and federal 
institutions, can amplify or mitigate this effect,  
As a measure of federal institutions, we use first the Regional Authority index (RAI) which 
ranges from 0 in countries like Iceland, Estonia and Latvia, to over 36 in Belgium and 
Germany. We argue that economic conditions will have a stronger negative impact on the 
nationalization of politics when federal institutions give way to a regionalized frame of party 
competition, and when organizational bonds between national and regional copartisans are 
looser. These two mechanisms will be more likely to unfold when federal arrangements 
provide significant autonomy to regional policy makers. To capture this specific dimension, 
two other variables measure more specifically the authority exercised by the regional 
government over those who live in the region (self-rule) and the extent to which regional 
governments are autonomous rather than deconcentrated (institutional depth). The self-rule 
index ranges from 0 in similar countries to over 22 in United States, Belgium, and Germany, 
and the institutional depth index ranges from 0 to around 5.5 in Germany and around 5 in 
Belgium and Italy. All three variables are taken from Hooghe et al. (2008). 
To test for the interactive impact of the electoral system we use three conventional variables: 
the ln average district magnitude, the effective electoral threshold (Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989; Lijphart, 1994) and a majoritarian dummy variable. The ln average district magnitude 
measures the average number of seats allocated per district. The larger this number, the more 
proportional the allocation is and the lower the electoral penalty of non-coordination across 
districts. The effective electoral threshold indicates the average share of votes that a party 
needs to win to secure parliamentary representation with a probability of at least 50 per cent. 
It ranges from 0.375 in single member district systems to 0 in proportional systems with one 
single national district. The majoritarian dummy takes value 1 if the country has a Single 
Member District (SMD) system and 0 otherwise.  Note that while district magnitude is a 
measure of electoral proportionality, the effective electoral threshold and majoritarian are 
measures of electoral majoritarianism.  
To account for the robustness of these measures and to be sure we are capturing the 
institutional effect isolated from other covariates, we include two further controls to these 
estimations. For the analyses of the interactive effect of the electoral system and economic 
growth, we include a control for the effective number of parties at the national level. As low 
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economic growth might make more likely the emergence of small regionally-based parties, 
this allows us to measure the interactive impact of electoral system institutions discounting 
the fact that proportional systems already have more parties. In the analyses of federal 
institutions, we include a control for the geographic concentration of diversity, using a 
measure of cross-cuttingness between ethnic groups and geography (ethno-geographic cross 
cuttingness). This measure was developed by Selway (2011) using survey data and it captures 
the extent to which the distribution of ethnic groups overlaps with geography in a given 
country. When the cross-cutting index scores low, it means that each ethnic group tends to 
live in different regions, whereas it scores high if different ethnic groups are distributed in a 
similar way across the territory.  
Table 6 replicates the basic model of the paper introducing the interaction between the federal 
variables and the crisis dummies. We use the Growth 3 years and Growth 4 years variables. 
Similar controls of tables 1 to 3 are included, but not reported. Results go in line with our 
theoretical expectations. First, and most importantly, we do find, as hypothesized, a strong 
moderating effect of federal institutions in the relationship between economic growth and 
levels of nationalization. The interaction coefficient in the six models is highly significant. 
This holds for the three measures of federalism and the two economic crisis variables. This 
means that periods of low economic growth are more likely to regionalize politics under 
decentralized political structures than under centralized ones. When there is decentralization, 
the institutional setting allows for a more intense expression of divergent interests both within 
political parties and across constituencies. Economic crises will provide incentives to regional 
elites to adopt electoral strategies that cater to the subnational interests, making more difficult 
to political parties to have a cohesive national platform and aggregate divergent 
preferences20. Economic downturns under decentralized political structures will result in 
centripetal pressures within national political parties. The relevance of the vertical structure 
of power when accounting for the effect of economic crises on party systems is also exposed 
as the variable economic crisis loses its significance, indicating that for very centralized 
countries an economic downturn has no effect on nationalization. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of the ethnic-geographic cross-cuttingness, which indicates that our findings are not 
an artifact of ethnic diversity in the country.  
                                                          
20
 We also ran these models using the shared-rule variable from the same dataset. The interactions are of lower 
magnitude and significance, indicating that the kind of mechanisms we are capturing are stronger where 
federalism is designed to provide regional governments with autonomy over policy-making, giving more them 
incentives to pursue their own regional agendas, which, in turn, fragmentize the party system. 
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Figure 1 displays this differential effect graphically (using model 6.4). It can be seen that for 
low levels of decentralization, economic crises do not have any differential impact on party 
system nationalization. In fact, in completely centralized countries the level of nationalization 
is expected to be the same regardless of economic conditions. As levels of regional authority 
increase, nationalization decreases. However, the decrease is substantially sharper if there is 
an economic crisis. For high levels of decentralization, such as Belgium, an economic 
downturn operates as a centrifugal force in the party system that reduces the nationalization 
score to almost 0.7. If there is not an economic crisis over the electoral cycle, the predicted 
score is around 0.77. This is a very substantial effect of almost a standard deviation of the 
PSNS in the sample.  
[TABLE 6 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 replicates these models, but including now the interactions with the electoral systems. 
We do not find any effect of the electoral system in reducing or amplifying the impact of 
economic crises. The interaction is not significant across the four models. This confirms that 
the impact of electoral rules upon nationalization is not univocal. While in majoritarian 
electoral systems parties might concentrate their electoral efforts in those constituencies 
where they need to make fewer compromises, in proportional electoral systems 
regionalization might increase through the emergence of new parties. If something, the 
interactions in our models are consistent in their sign, pointing out that the latter mechanism 
might be stronger. This is the argument developed in recent research by Lago-Peñas and 
Lago Peñas (2016) who claim that the permeability of proportional electoral systems make 
more likely small regionally-based political parties to emerge in periods of low economic 
growth. However, our results are far from significant, so we cannot conclude any clear 
differentiated effect of low economic growth under different types of electoral rules.  
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The literature that explores variation in party system nationalization has provided significant 
theoretical and empirical insights into the long-term processes that account for the emergence 
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and consolidation of national party systems. Yet some issues still call for further analysis, 
particularly a better understanding of the role of short-term factors in explaining variation in 
the nationalization of politics. This paper contributes to fill this literature gap by analyzing 
the effect of economic conditions upon party system nationalization across more than fifty 
countries and almost sixty years of elections.  
The basic argument of the paper is that economic recessions will decrease levels of 
nationalization through different mechanisms, namely an increase in the divergence of 
preferences across the territory and the emergence of new political forces. The paper also 
provides some theoretical insights into the role of institutional conditions in moderating the 
impact of the economy upon levels of nationalization. 
Empirical evidence shows that lower economic growth is associated to a decrease in levels of 
party system nationalization, a result that is robust to variation in the specification of the 
econometric model and the use of different measures of nationalization. The impact of the 
economy upon nationalization is strongest for economic conditions measured three to four 
years prior to the election, which corresponds with the period in which we expect some of the 
causal mechanisms (changes in electoral competition and individual preferences) to develop. 
The empirical analysis also shows that federal institutions moderate the relationship between 
economic conditions and party system nationalization: the negative effect of economic crises 
upon nationalization is stronger in federal countries than in unitary ones.  
There are three ways in which this research could be advanced in the future. First, the paper 
suggests several theoretical mechanisms through which economic crises may trigger changes 
in the nationalization of politics, such as the emergence of new political parties or pDUWLHV¶
difficulties to keep together a heterogeneous electoral platform during hard times. However, 
the analysis does not provide evidence on the operation of these mechanisms. A future way to 
strengthen the theoretical insights of the paper would be to provide a more nuance account of 
the specific changes in electoral competition and individual preferences that are triggered by 
economic crises and that may result in lower levels of nationalization.  
Second, IROORZLQJXSRQ0RUJHUQVWHQHWDO¶V(2009) theoretical and empirical distinction 
between dynamic and static nationalization, further developments of the paper could analyze 
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whether the impact of economic crises is significantly different across nationalization types. 
In this paper we have theorized about the impact of economic crises upon static/distributional 
nationalization, i.e. the degree of heterogeneity of party support across electoral districts. 
However, future research could expand the theoretical and empirical insights of the paper and 
analyze the effect of economic crises upon dynamic nationalization, testing whether 
economic crises ZHDNHQVSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDOWLHVDFURVVGLVWULFWVRUDOWHUQDWively, it 
makes the fate of a party members rise and fall together. 
Finally, this paper shows that the impact of the economy upon party system nationalization is 
not a linear one and only operates for economic crises. When the economy does not perform 
well, party system regionalization increases, but we do not find evidence of a reverse impact 
when economic conditions improve. If levels of party system nationalization are more elastic 
to economic crises than to economic upturns we should find some evidence of a steady 
increase in general levels of party system regionalization. Certainly, a better understating of 
variation in levels of party system nationalization over time requires further theoretical and 
empirical analysis on whether the impact of short-term shocks upon nationalization is 
eventually overturn by long-term factors.  
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Table 1: Economic growth and party system nationalization. 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with fixed-effects, AR(1) 
 Dependent Variable: PSNS 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) 
VARIABLES Growth 
Election Year 
Growth 2 
Years 
Growth 3 
Years 
Growth 4 
Years 
     
Ln District Magnitude 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.024** 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] 
Ln population 0.037** 0.035** 0.029 0.033* 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Trade -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Lagged GDPpc 0.007 0.010 0.022 0.014 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.032] 
Growth 1st quintile -0.006 -0.011 -0.019** -0.023*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Growth 2nd quintile 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Growth 4th quintile 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.007 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Growth 5th quintile -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 
 [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] 
     
Observations 326 326 325 321 
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Economic growth and inflation score. 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with fixed-effects, AR(1) 
 Dependent Variable: Inflation and Dispersion Score 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
VARIABLES Growth 
Election Year 
Growth 2 
Years 
Growth 3 
Years 
Growth 4 
Years 
     
Ln District 
Magnitude 
-1.283*** -1.276*** -1.294*** -1.279*** 
 
[0.248] [0.249] [0.247] [0.248] 
Ln population 0.518 0.519 0.558 0.631* 
 
[0.358] [0.365] [0.365] [0.360] 
Trade 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] 
Lagged GDPpc -0.034 -0.042 -0.112 -0.161 
 
[0.522] [0.531] [0.533] [0.529] 
Growth 1st quintile 0.192 0.193 0.343** 0.533*** 
 
[0.167] [0.174] [0.168] [0.180] 
Growth 2nd quintile -0.028 -0.113 0.031 0.157 
 
[0.166] [0.162] [0.160] [0.161] 
Growth 4th quintile -0.062 -0.003 -0.180 0.033 
 
[0.181] [0.175] [0.174] [0.185] 
Growth 5th quintile 0.335 0.228 0.270 0.299 
 
[0.203] [0.217] [0.208] [0.249] 
 
    
Observations 324 324 323 319 
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Unemployment and party system nationalization. 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with fixed-effects, AR(1) 
 Dependent Variable: PSNS 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
VARIABLES Growth 
Unemploym 
Election Year 
Growth 
Unemploym 
2 Years 
Growth 
Unemploym 3 
Years 
Growth 
Unemploym 4 
Years 
     
Ln District Magnitude 0.038* 0.038* 0.032 0.033 
 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] 
Ln population 0.030 0.029 0.018 0.014 
 
[0.040] [0.040] [0.043] [0.043] 
Trade -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Lagged GDPpc -0.014 -0.014 -0.002 0.005 
 
[0.076] [0.076] [0.078] [0.078] 
Lagged Unemployment 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Growth Unemploym 1st 
quintile 
-0.017 -0.007 -0.026 -0.011 
 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.021] [0.026] 
Growth Unemploym 
2nd quintile 
-0.011 -0.001 -0.015 -0.016 
 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.019] 
Growth Unemploym 4th 
quintile 
-0.027 -0.022 -0.035** -0.034** 
 
[0.017] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] 
Growth Unemploym 5th 
quintile 
-0.018 -0.023 -0.039* -0.025 
 
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] 
 
    
 
    
Observations 163 163 161 160 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Economic growth and party system nationalization. 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations with random effects, AR(1) 
 DV: PSNS DV: Inflation Score 
VARIABLES (4.1) 
Growth 3 
years 
(4.2) 
Growth 4 
years 
(4.3) 
Growth 3 
Years 
(4.4) 
Growth 4 
Years 
 
    
Ln District Magnitude 0.006 0.006 -0.848*** -0.841*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.169] [0.168] 
Ln population -0.025*** -0.027*** 0.781*** 0.819*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.186] [0.184] 
Trade -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.012** 0.013** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.006] 
Polity Index 0.004 0.003 -0.018 -0.014 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.093] [0.094] 
Duration 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.006] 
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.193*** -0.191*** 2.154* 2.133* 
 [0.063] [0.062] [1.266] [1.254] 
Lagged GDP pc 0.001 0.001 -0.165 -0.162 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.154] [0.152] 
Growth 1st quintile -0.014* -0.019** 0.315* 0.533*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.190] [0.200] 
Growth 2nd quintile 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.143 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.178] [0.182] 
Growth 4th quintile 0.002 0.006 -0.013 0.159 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.194] [0.201] 
Growth 5th quintile 0.004 -0.000 0.205 0.228 
 [0.009] [0.011] [0.224] [0.263] 
     
Observations 351 347 350 346 
Number of countries 46 46 47 47 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Economic growth and party system nationalization.  
Error Correction Models 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) 
VARIABLES ǻPSNS ǻPSNS ǻInflation ǻInflation 
     
Lagged Dep. 
Variable 
-0.2284*** -0.2351*** -0.1971*** -0.1967*** 
 [0.037] [0.038] [0.034] [0.034] 
ǻ District Magnitude 0.0081 0.0084 -1.1852*** -1.1917*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.210] [0.211] 
Lagged District 
Magnitude 
0.0020 0.0019 -0.1385** -0.1356** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.056] [0.056] 
ǻ Ln Population -0.0127 -0.0246 0.3475 0.7475 
 [0.130] [0.133] [2.666] [2.692] 
Lagged Ln 
Population 
-0.0082*** -0.0087*** 0.1634*** 0.1734*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.057] [0.057] 
ǻ Trade -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 0.0160** 0.0154** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.007] 
Lagged Trade -0.0004** -0.0004** 0.0043 0.0046 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] 
Lagged GDP pc -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0286 0.0332 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.042] [0.042] 
Crisis 3 years 0.0009**  -0.0202**  
 [0.000]  [0.010]  
Crisis 4 years  0.0006*  -0.0162** 
  [0.000]  [0.008] 
     
Observations 364 360 358 354 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Economic Crisis and Federalism. 
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations, AR(1) 
 Dependent Variable: PSNS 
 Economic Crisis (3 years) Economic Crisis (4 years) 
VARIABLES (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) 
       
Crisis 0.008 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.021* 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] 
Regional Authority 
Index (RAI) 
-0.002*   -0.002*   
 [0.001]   [0.001]   
Self rule  -0.002   -0.001  
  [0.001]   [0.001]  
Institutional depth   -0.011*   -0.009 
   [0.006]   [0.006] 
Crisis * RAI -0.001***   -0.002***   
 [0.001]   [0.001]   
Crisis * Self Rule  -0.002***   -0.003***  
  [0.001]   [0.001]  
Crisis * Inst. Depth   -0.011***   -0.015*** 
   [0.004]   [0.004] 
Ethno geographic 
crosscuttingness 
0.223*** 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.225*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 
 [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.056] 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321 
Number of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Constant and control variables not shown. Standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Economic Crisis and Electoral System.  
Time-Series-Cross Sectional Estimations, AR(1) 
 Dependent Variable: PSNS 
 Economic Crisis (3 years) Economic Crisis (4 years) 
VARIABLES (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) 
       
Crisis -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] 
Ln District Magnitude 0.009   0.009   
 [0.006]   [0.006]   
Effect. Elect Threshold  -0.064   -0.065  
  [0.052]   [0.052]  
Majoritarian   -0.010   -0.011 
   [0.016]   [0.016] 
Crisis*Ln District 
Magnitude 
-0.001   -0.001   
 [0.003]   [0.003]   
Crisis* Effect. Elect 
Thresh. 
 -0.022   -0.014  
  [0.036]   [0.037]  
Crisis*Majoritarian   -0.009   -0.005 
   [0.011]   [0.011] 
Effective Number of 
Parties 
-0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
       
CONTROLS 379 379 379 379 379 379 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Number of countries 52 52 57 52 52 57 
Constant and control variables not shown. Standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Effect of economic crises for different levels of federalism. (90% confidence 
intervals) 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
One of the main mechanisms by which we expect economic crises to reduce party system 
nationalization is by their asymmetric impact on countries¶ economy. We argue that 
economic crises increase interregional inequality and this brings about divergence of 
redistribution preferences. To test our assumption, we take data from the OECD Regional 
Statistics and measure interregional inequality as the coefficient of variation of regional GDP 
per capita. We this variable -measured both as the level of variation and the annual 
percentage variation- on national GDP growth. Table A.1 displays the results. They show that 
there is a consistently strong and significant negative relation between national economic 
growth and the variation of GCP per capita across regions. Figure A.1 simulates the results of 
model A.2, showing the extent to which a shift from a strong recession to a prosperous year 
implies a significant reduction of the regional GDP divergence.  
 
Table A.1: Effect of national economic growth on regional variation of GDP 
 (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) (A.5) 
 DV: 
Coefficient 
Variation 
DV: 
Coefficient 
Variation 
DV:  
Coefficient 
Variation 
DV: ǻ % 
Coefficient 
Variation 
DV: ǻ % 
Coefficient 
Variation 
VARIABLES OLS 
regression 
Fixed 
effects 
regression 
Fixed effects 
regression + 
LDV 
Fixed 
effects 
regression 
Fixed effects 
regression + 
LDV 
      
National GDP 
growth 
-0.493*** -0.188*** -0.173*** -0.839* -0.806** 
 [0.172] [0.062] [0.066] [0.451] [0.403] 
      
Observations 302 302 285 285 268 
Number of 
countries 
17 17 17 17 17 
Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data cover the period 1990-
2013, and include Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
and United States of America. 
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Figure A.1 
 
  
34 
 
Table A.2: Elections in the main sample 
Albania 2009 Finland 1966-2007 Netherlands 1967-2010 
Argentina 1987-2007 France 1981-2002 New Zealand 2005-2011 
Australia 1963-1984 Germany 1976-2009 Norway 1965-2009 
Austria 1966-2008 Greece 1963-2000 Peru 1990-2011 
Barbados 1976-2008 Grenada 1995-1999 Philippines 2001-2010 
Belgium 1965-1995 Honduras 1985-2001 Poland 1997-2005 
Bolivia 1993-2005 Hungary 1998-2010 Portugal 1979-2011 
Brazil 1990-2006 Iceland 1967-1995 Romania 1996-2000 
Bulgaria 1997 India 1984-2004 Saint Lucia 1987-2006 
Canada 1963-2011 Ireland 1977-2011 South Korea 1988-2008 
Colombia 2006 Italy 1968-1996 Spain 1982-2008 
Costa Rica 1966-2010 Jamaica 1972-1997 Sri Lanka 2000-2010 
Czech Republic 1996-2006 Japan 1963-1993 Sweden 1964-2006 
Denmark 1964-2011 Latvia 2006 Switzerland 1987-1995 
Dominica 2005 Luxembourg 1968-1994 Thailand 1983-1992 
Dominican 
Republic 1970-2006 Mauritius 1983-2005 Turkey 1965-2011 
Estonia 1999-2003 Mexico 2000-2009 
United 
Kingdom 1966-2010 
    
United States 1962-2010 
 
 
